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Investment Timing Game of B2B E-commerce Platforms
Under Network Externality
Li Zhu1, Li Li1,
1

School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology,
Nanjing, 210094, China

Abstract: In the competitive investment environment of B2B E-commerce platform, the first mover has the advantage of
network externality while the followers have the advantage of declining IT cost. Aimed to investigate the optimal
Information Technology (IT) investment timing strategy under the interplay of network effect and declining IT cost, this
paper develops an option game model under the uncertainty environment where the market demand is stochastic and the
random command shock follows a geometric Brownian motion process. By solving this option game model, we offer the
payoffs and threshold of platform as leader, follower or simultaneous investor. Equilibrium results show that there exist two
kinds of equilibrium strategies, simultaneous equilibrium and sequential equilibrium when we take into account the
interaction of network effect and IT cost decline and platforms choose which strategy depend on the relative magnitudes of
network externality and IT cost decline level.
Keywords: B2B E-commerce platform, IT investment strategy, network externality, IT cost decline, investment timing

1.

INTRODUCTION
Our country is basking in a great boom in B2B e-commerce industry in recent years. According to the

market monitoring data reported by China Electronic Research Center

[1]

, gross turnover of Chinese B2B

e-commerce platform was 11.5 billion in the first half year of 2014 increased by 22.6% than the former year.
The rapid development of B2B e-commerce provides huge market opportunity for e-intermediaries. On the other
hand, competition between B2B e-intermediaries has become increasingly fierce. The number of B2B
e-intermediary platform has reached 12,030 as of Jun 2014. Among these B2B platforms Alibaba.com account
for 40.5% of the B2B market, ranked the 1st market share in 2014 followed by Mysteel.com, global sources.com
and Hc360.com. The data indicates that at present stage the B2B market in our country gradually formed an
oligopoly competition led by Alibaba.com who started early. However, in the real market some examples, such
as cn.toocle.com, have been reported that late entrants may spar with their opponent by choosing the appropriate
Information Technology (IT) investment timing. These cases show that the use of IT has become a primary
factor for e-commerce platforms in the competitions for B2B market. Above all, it is vital to make a scientific IT
investment decision and choose appropriate investment timing.
When making IT investment decision, enterprises will take many factors into consideration. Existing
literature focus mainly on three important factors, namely, switching cost
declining Information Technology (IT) cost

[9-14]

[2-3]

, network externality

[4-8]

and

. On the one hand, network externality, as a characteristic of

B2B platform; provide early entrants with a first-mover advantage that comes from the user base they captured
in an early stage. Users have higher perception value of a platform under the network externality. As a result,
they are more willing to attend and persist in using the platform, which generates an aggregation
effect——more buyers attract more seller user and more sellers draw more buyers in return. Therefore, the
two-side users are the sources of a platform’s profit and user scale is the foundation for a platform to survive and
develop. Empirical studies show that network externality has a positive effect on user behavior in both B2B
e-intermediary service

[4]

and mobile short message service

[5]

. Theoretic researches pay more attention on the
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marketing strategy of B2B platform including pricing, differentiation and other marketing strategy issues.
Katsamakas and Bakos [6] studied B2B platform pricing strategy considering cross network externality between
two sides users on the platform. Yoo et al. [7] further assumed that the competition between buyers would bring
about a negative network effects in among supplier sides. They investigated the pricing strategy of B2B
electronic intermediary platform under the interaction of these different kinds of network externality. Bhargava
[8]

considered the situation where there existing both negative network effect and cross network externality. He

examined the differentiation strategy of information intermediary website taking into account buyers’ preference
heterogeneity. Learning from observation of B2B market, we find that network externality within the seller
group on the platform is affected by the stage of market development. And in the initial stage of the market, the
positive network effect manifest as aggregation and demonstration effect holds the advantage while in the
mature period the negative effect dominates. As B2B e-commerce in our country is on a high growth path in our
country, we focus only on the positive network effect in this paper. On the other hand, the latter entrants could
benefit from the declining IT cost. The development and operation of B2B platform depend mainly on IT
investment

[9]

which includes the investment on human capital, hardware assets and software assets caused by

the IT research and development to upgrade platform’s quality. Empirical research shows that the service quality
level of B2B platform could affect the consumers’ behavior and influences the consumer scale of the platform
[10]

. As a result, the latter entrants can utilize an advanced information technology with lower costs and higher

quality to attract more consumers

[11]

. Studies that consider IN cost decline have concentrated on sequential

duopoly enterprises’ product positioning and quality strategy. Tyagi

[12]

proposed that the uncertainty of latter

entrant’s cost would influence first mover’s product position. Demirhan

[13]

supposed IT cost is the quadratic

function of quality and found the effect of IT cost decline on platform’s quality was influenced by users’
preference. Existing researches concerned less about the timing of IT investment. However, with the intersection
of fist-mover advantage and latter-mover advantage in this market, it would be extremely important to the
platform choose the proper IT investment timing strategy which deserves more attention.
Based on the analysis of previous research, we consider both the first mover’s advantage of network effect
and the follower’s advantage of declining IT cost in the IT investment timing strategy of B2B e-commerce
platforms. To analyze how these factors influence IT investment strategy, we develop an option game model of
duopoly B2B platforms in the environment with market demand uncertainty based on classical standard option
game model [15-17]. After solving and analyzing the equilibrium of this game theoretic model, we can investigate
the interplay of all these related factors on IT investment strategies of B2B e-commerce platforms.
2.

THE MODLE
We consider two identical, risk neutral and value maximizing B2B platforms that can make investment

expenditure to improve the quality of their service through innovative products and value-added services. We
assume that investment is bound to be successful, whereas the market demand is stochastic. Risk-free interest
rate in the market is set to be r. The inverse demand function of platform i (i=1, 2) can be expressed as follows:
Pi (t ) = Y (t ) D( Ni, Nj )

In this equation, P i (t) represents the price of the upgraded platform i; D(Ni, Nj) denotes the market demand
parameter of platform i that depend on both platform’s investment state. Y(t) is the random command shock in
the B2B e-commerce market that follows a geometric Brownian motion process:
dY (t ) = α Y (t )dt + σ Y (t )dz

Where α ∈ (0, r ) is the drift parameter of Y(t)’s growth expectation, σ is the volatility parameter, and dz is
an increment of a Wiener process under risk neutral measurement. Thus dz is distributed according to a normal
distribution with mean zero and variance dt.
We make the following assumption on D’s with four possible cases: D(0,0) indicates neither platforms have
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invested; D(1,1) denotes both platforms have invested; D(1,0) represents platform i have invested while
platform j haven’t; D(0,1) represents platform j have invested while platform i haven’t. As is stated, the two
B2B platforms have been active in the market and one of them success in IT investment would cut down the
other one’s user amount. First, a platform makes the highest amount of users with a given IT investment if the
other firm gives up the option to upgrade (monopoly). It also holds that, given its own IT investment decision,
user amount will be lowest when the other platform is a strong competitor. Second, given the technology of the
competitor, the platform’s user base is higher when grasping the investment option. Finally, since both platforms
have been active in the market before, the user amount on either platform is non-negative. In this way the
following inequalities are obtained: D(1,0) > D(1,1) > D(0,0) > D(0,1) > 0
Considering B2B e-commerce platform’s characteristic of network externality, the first movers may enjoy
the advantage that comes from the user base they captured in an early stage. That is, for the same IT investment
innovation project, the leading platform would earn more users than the follower due to the aggregation effect
under network effect. This implies that, the inequality, D(1,0) - D(0,0)> D(1,1) - D(0,1), makes sense.
As to the IT investment expenditure, we assume two kinds of IT investment cost named fixed cost and
variable cost in platforms’ IT innovation, expressed as Ii and Ci respectively. The fixed cost refers to the
expenditure that is used to improve platform’s quality level while the variable cost refers to the extra
maintenance fee due to the higher platform quality. Given that platform 1’s fixed cost and variable cost are set to
be I and C, then the two platforms’ investment costs are:
⎧ I1 = I , I 2 = kI
⎨
⎩C1 = C , C 2 = μ C

The constant terms μ and k indicate the declining IT cost, that is, the following platform involves in a lower
IT investment cost than the leader.
3.

THE PAYOFFS
As our purpose is to establish the analysis on duopoly platforms’ investment strategy, we first have to

determine the payoffs in cases the platform roles are fixed beforehand. For definiteness and without loss of
generality, our analysis focuses only on platform i, who has 3 possible investment behaviors: invests first and
gets the leader role; invests latter to be the follower and choose to invest simultaneously with the other platform.
Backward induction method will be applied to solve the dynamic game and payoffs are obtained in three cases.
3.1 Follower’s payoff and investment threshold
IT investment option value function of platform i, as the follower, satisfy the partial differential equation:
1 2 2 ∂ 2V
∂V
+ αY
− rV + YD (0,1) = 0
σ Y
∂Y 2
∂Y
2

The homogeneous solution of the above ordinary differential equation can be expressed in the form of
V (Y) = B1Y β1 + B2Y β2 where β1 , β 2 can be solved from the equation: 1 σ 2 β 2 + (α − 1 σ 2 ) β − r = 0
2

β1 =
β2 =

− (α − 0.5σ 2 ) +

(α − 0.5σ 2 ) 2 + 2 r σ

σ
− (α − 0.5σ ) −
2

2

>1

2

(α − 0.5σ ) + 2 r σ
2

σ

2

2

2

2

<0

When Y→0+, there are Y β → 0 , Y β → +∞ . In this case, Vi F (Y) → +∞ . However, when the demand is
1

2

approaching to zero, the value of investment option can never be infinitely great. To avoid this paradox, constant
coefficient B2 must equal 0. Therefore, the IT investment option value is obtained as follows:
YD (0,1)
⎧
β1
⎪⎪ B1Y + r − α
V i (Y ) = ⎨
⎪ YD (1,1) − (I + C i )
i
⎪⎩ r − α
r
F

Y < Yi F
Y ≥ Yi F
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Then we can solve the followers of the optimal investment threshold Yi F by using dynamic programming
method. Value function at the point of Yi F should satisfy value-matching condition and smooth pasting
condition:
ci
YD (0,1) YD (1,1)
⎧
β1
.....(1)
⎪⎪ B1Y + r − α = r − α − (I i + r )
⎨
⎪V F ' (Y F ) = YD(1,1) . ...............................(2)
i
i
r −α
⎩⎪

Combine equation (1) and (2) we will get:
ci
β1
r −α
⎧ F
⎪ Y i = β − 1 ⋅ D (1,1) − D (0,1) ⋅ (I i + r )
⎪
1
⎨
F 1− β1
[D (1,1) − D (0,1)]
⎪ B = (Y i )
⋅
⎪⎩ 1
β1
r −α

Substitute B1 into Vi F (Y) , follower’s investment value can be expressed:
⎧ YD (0,1) ⎧ Yi F [D(1,1) − D(0,1)]
Ci ⎫ Y β
+⎨
− Ii − ⎬ ⋅ ( F ) 1 ... (3)
⎪
⎪ r −α
r −α
r ⎭ Yi
F
⎩
Vi (Y) = ⎨
Ci
⎪ YD (1,1)
....................... (4)
⎪⎩ r − α − I i − r

Expression (3) denotes the present value of platform i’ s profit when it hasn’t invested any more, of which
the first item is platform i’ s profit if it never invest on the new technology and the second item is the option
value of this IT investment. Expression (4) denotes the payoff of platform i after its investment.
The optimal investment timing is at the moment when the random demand shock equals the investment
threshold:
Ti F = inf {t : Y ≥ Yi F }

3.2 Leader’s payoff and investment threshold
Assuming that the leader, platform i, invests only once and in this monopoly situation the option value of
leader satisfy the following partial differential equation:
1 2 2 ∂ 2V
∂V
σ Y
+ αY
− rV + YD (1, 0) = 0
2
∂Y 2
∂Y

Solve the differential equation we can obtain the option value:
V (Y) = B2 Y β1 +

YD(1, 0)
r −α

At the point of the follower’s investment threshold Y = Y jF , leader’s investment option value equals to the
value when the two platforms invest simultaneously. At this point, the following equation can be established:
B2 (Y jF ) β 1 +

Solve the equation:

⇒ B2 =

Y jF D(1, 0)
r −α

=

Y jF D(1,1)
r −α

Y [D(1,1) − D(1, 0)]
F
j

(Y jF ) β1 (r − α )

As we have stated, D(1,1) < D(1,0), so B2 is negative which means that in the duopoly economic
environment the entry of follower would decrease leader’s investment value.
At the point of Y < Y jF when the follow make no investment the leader’s investment value can be expressed
as the option value minus the investment cost:
Vi L (Y) =

Y jF [D(1,1) − D(1, 0)]
C
YD (1, 0)
Y
+ ( F ) β1
− Ii − i
r −α
r −α
r
Yj

At the point of Y ≥ Y jF when both platforms have made invested, the value of both platforms is equal to the
simultaneous investment value:
Vi L (Y) =

C
YD (1,1)
− Ii − i
r −α
r
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To sum up, the payoff of leading platform i can be concluded as follows:
⎧ YD (1, 0) Y jF [D(1,1) − D(1, 0)] Y β
C
+
⋅ ( F ) 1 − I i − i Y < Y jF ... (5)
⎪
⎪ r −α
r −α
Yj
r
F
Vi (Y) = ⎨
Ci
⎪ YD (1,1)
F
Y ≥ Y j ...................... (6)
⎪⎩ r − α − I i − r

Faced with threat of rival’s preemptive investment behavior, platform wouldn’t wait for monopoly
investment critical value point. If the payoffs of being the leader are greater than that of to be the follower,
platform i is motivated to become the leader especially when it knows that the competitor face the same
situation. In that case, platform i’s strategy is to invest and to become the leader at the point when platform j’s
payoffs of to be the leader are equal to that of to be the follower. Due to the symmetry of this problem, there
exists Vi L (Y) = ViF (Y) and V (Y) = V (Y) for all the stochastic demand Y. Therefore, we can set the leader’s
L
j

investment threshold

Yi

L

as

F
j

0 < Yi L < Y jF

and the value of leader and follower are equivalent:
Yi L = {0 < Yi L < Y jF | VL (Y) = VF (Y)}

3.3 Payoff of simultaneous investment
In the circumstance of simultaneous investment, platform i’ s payoffs are as follows:
Vi s (Y) =

C
YD(1,1)
− Ii − i
r −α
r

If the stochastic demand is high enough that Y ≥ Y jF , simultaneous investment is optimal for both platforms.
Otherwise in the case of Y < Y jF it would be wrong.
Figure 1 presents the magnitude relation of duopoly platforms’ investment payoffs and thresholds. Where
VL(Y), VF(Y) and VS(Y) are platforms’ investment payoff curves as
the leader, follower and simultaneous investor, respectively. While
YL, YM and YF denote the investment threshold of platform to be the
leader, monopoly and follower, respectively. When there is only
one platform in the market, it will invest at the point of YM. The
timing would be brought forward (YL< YM) once being aware of the
competitor’s threat. When the demand arrives at YL, VL(Y) =VF(Y),
both platforms have incentive to preempt investment and strive for
the leadership. The successful one would be the leader while the
other platform would watch its time and enter at the point Y=YF.

Figure 1. Values and investment thresholds of

On the situation that the market demand is high enough, the two

duopoly platforms

platforms would invest at the same time Y=YF and they would gain
the same investment payoffs.
4.

EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

4.1 Effect of investment cost
In this section, we determine the impact of Ii and Ci on platforms’ investment timing and strategies. For a
given value of other parameters, we can get the impact of the investment cost on platforms’ investment
threshold as follows:
∂ Yi F
β1
r −α
=
⋅
>0
β1 − 1 D (1,1) − D(0,1)
∂I i
∂ Yi F
β1
1
=
⋅
>0
β1 − 1 D (1,1) − D(0,1)
∂Ci

The above inequalities show a positive correlation between follower’s investment critical value and costs.
In the real market of B2B e-commerce industry, follower platforms process a cost advantage due to the
declining IT cost as a result of which their investment threshold will decrease. Therefore, platform still have

172

The Fifteenth Wuhan International Conference on E-Business－E-government and IT-enabled Social Governance

opportunity to invest for the second time even if they fail in first preemption.
4.2 Equilibrium strategies
With the interaction of network externality and IT cost decline, platforms have two kinds of investment
strategy equilibrium: simultaneous equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. As we have discussed that the fix
investment cost and the variable cost have the same influence on platform’s investment critical value. So for
convenience, we assume an equivalent declining level of fixed cost and variable cost, that is k=µ, and set
Wi = Ii +

Ci
, i = 1, 2.
r

Without loss of generality, we hold the assumption that platform 1 is the leading investor

while platform 2 is the follower. We will investigate the how IT cost decline and network externality interplay
on the equilibrium strategy.
Huisman et al [15] have proved that the leader has one and only IT investment threshold T1L = inf {t : Y ≥ Y1L } ,
where

Y1L =

C
U1
β1
, U1 =
⋅ (r − α ) ⋅ (Ii + i ).
D (1, 0) − D(0, 0)
r
β1 − 1

In order to get the equilibrium results, we first have to determine

the relative magnitude of the two platforms’ investment threshold. In the competitive B2B market, a platform
gains more users as monopoly than being the duopoly (D(1,1) < D(1,0)). There exists a W1* = 1 W1 D(1,1)
k

making

YL1 = YF 2

D (1, 0)

established.

Case 1: If W1 ∈ (0, W1* ) , then YL < YF .
1

2

On condition that IT cost decline level (1/k) is greater than network externality (D(1,0)/D(1,1)), platform
1’s investment threshold is lower than platform 2’s and platform 1 will invest before TF2. As V1L (YL ) < V1F (YF )
1

2

platform 1 is incline to be the follower. But platform 1 believes that platform 2 will not invest before TF2 for
which it may choose delay strategy and invest at its optimal investment point TL1 for YL1 is the optimal
investment threshold under monopoly environment. And platform 2 will invest at TF2 accordingly. Thus we get
sequential investment equilibrium as is shown in figure 2.
Case 2: If W1 ∈ (W1* , W2 ) , then YL ≥ YF .
1

2

On condition that network externality (D(1,0)/D(1,1)) is greater than IT cost decline level (1/k), the leader,
platform 1’s investment critical value is greater than that of the follower, platform 2. On such occasion, platform
2 would choose to invest immediately once platform 1 make its investment and the two platforms will end up
invest at the same time TF2. Thus we get a simultaneous equilibrium as is shown in figure 3.

Figure 2. Values of platform 1 in case 1

5.

Figure 3. Values of platform 1 in case 2

NUMERIC ANALYSIS
In this section numeric analysis was performed by which we further verify the impact of network effect and
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the declining IT cost on platforms’ investment strategy. We make the assumption on a virtual B2B market where
there exist two B2B e-commerce platforms both of which possess an IT innovation investment opportunity to
upgrade their platforms. The two platforms’ market demand follow geometric Brownian motion process and we
set α=1.5%, σ=10%, r=5%, I=60million, C=2million. Supposed that after upgrading they would possess an
absolutely new market, that is D(0,1)=D(0,0)=0. For convenience of calculation we set D(1,0)=1. In the
following we will assign a few of numerical simulation to k (<1) and D(1,1)/D(1,0) (<1) with the purpose of
obtain the investment threshold and equilibrium results shown in table 1:
Table 1.

The effect of network externality and declining IT cost on equilibrium

IT cost decline

Network externality coefficient

(Platform 1’s investment threshold,

Equilibrium

coefficient k

D (1,1) D(1, 0)

Platform 2’s investment threshold)

results

1

1
0.9
0.6
0.3

(6.16 , 6.16)
(6.16 , 6.84)
(6.16 , 10.27)
(6.16 , 20.53)

Simultaneous equilibrium
Sequential equilibrium
Sequential equilibrium
Sequential equilibrium

0.9

1
0.9
0.6
0.3

(5.54 , 5.54)
(6.16 , 6.16)
(6.16 , 9.24)
(6.16 , 18.48)

Simultaneous equilibrium
Simultaneous equilibrium
Sequential equilibrium
Sequential equilibrium

0.6

1
0.9
0.6
0.3

(3.70 , 3.70)
(4.11 , 4.11)
(6.16 , 6.16)
(6.16 , 12.32)

Simultaneous equilibrium
Simultaneous equilibrium
Simultaneous equilibrium
Sequential equilibrium

0.3

1
0.9
0.6
0.3

(1.85 , 1.85)
(2.05 , 2.05)
(3.08 , 3.08)
(6.16 , 6.16)

Simultaneous equilibrium
Simultaneous equilibrium
Simultaneous equilibrium
Simultaneous equilibrium

Table 1 shows that:
(1) There can be two kinds of equilibrium strategies, namely simultaneous equilibrium and sequential
equilibrium when we take into account the interaction of network effect and IT cost decline.
(2) Consistent with equilibrium analysis conclusion in previous section, equilibrium results depend on the
relative magnitude of the two variable factors. When the network effect level is larger (D(1,1)/D(1,0) being a
smaller value), threshold of leader is lower than that of the follower and a sequential equilibrium works out;
when the IT cost decline level is larger (k being a smaller value), threshold of follower is lower or equal that of
the leader and a simultaneous equilibrium comes about.
(3) When there is a fixed IT cost decline level, follower’s investment threshold is positively related to
network effect. With the decrease of the value of D(1,1)/D(1,0), follower’s investment threshold becomes larger.
(4) Without consideration of network effect, follower’s investment critical value has negative relation to IT
cost decline level. The threshold decreases as k’ s value decreasing.
6.

THE CONCLUSION
In this paper, we focus on B2B e-commerce platforms’ IT investment timing strategy of which the core

business is to provide trade service for small and medium Enterprises on internet market. Considering two
important characteristics of B2B platform, network externality and IT cost decline, we build up a duopoly B2B
platform IT innovation investment decision-making model based on the foundation framework of Huisman-Kort
model. By solving this option game model, we offer the payoffs and threshold of investment based on which
equilibrium and numeric analysis were discussed on B2B platforms’ investment strategies. Result shows that
there exist two kinds of equilibrium investment strategy, simultaneous equilibrium and sequential equilibrium,
with the interplay of the level of IT cost decline and network effect.
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Our work can offer guidance on IT innovation investment timing strategy for B2B e-intermediaries.
However, due to various restricts, there are still several some aspects need to be further perfected. Firstly, the
number of agent in the model can expand to multi-oligopolies to further discuss firms’ strategic interaction
among the whole industry which is more consistent with reality that more than one platform would like to be the
follower after observing the leader have succeed in IT innovation. Secondly, the study should be performed
under an incomplete information setting as no firm can obtain perfect information of rivals in the competitive
investment environment. In our further research, we will concentrate on the above factors so as to accord better
with the realistic market.
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